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Abstract
Bank loans are more available and cheaper for new and small businesses in the U.S. in
concentrated banking areas than in competitive banking areas. To explain this anomaly, we
analyze banks' decisions to screen projects and their subsequent competition in loan provisions.
It is shown that, by exacerbating the winner's curse, an increase in the number of banks can
reduce banks' screening probability by so much that the number of banks that actively compete
in loan provisions falls and the expected loan rate rises. This is the case when the screening
cost is low, which induces all active bidders to be informed. The opposite outcome occurs
when the screening cost is high, in which case there are su±ciently many uninformed banks
in bidding to attenuate the winner's curse. We also brie°y examine policy implications.
Keywords: Loans; Screening; Bidding; Informational externality.
JEL classi¯cations: G21, D44, L15.
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In an in°uential paper Petersen and Rajan (1995) have documented an anomaly in US loan
markets: Bank loans to new and small businesses are more available and cheaper in areas with
concentrated banks than in areas with competitive banks.1 We explain this anomaly by con-
structing a theory of loan market competition. The analysis is important not only for theory but
also for policy making. Because small businesses are often viewed as the backbone of economic
growth and because bank loans account for a dominant fraction of small business ¯nancing, the
analysis can help design policies to enhance small business ¯nancing and encourage growth.
One explanation for the anomaly, provided by Petersen and Rajan (1995), is that banks in
concentrated markets use their monopoly power to extract future surpluses from the ¯rm to
subsidize the higher loan availability and the lower loan rate at the beginning of the relationship.
Although this important insight has empirical support, the cross-subsidization does not work well
between young and not-so-young (but not-old) ¯rms. If a bank in a concentrated banking area
o®ers a higher loan availability and a lower loan rate to young ¯rms with the intention to exchange
for future surpluses, it has even greater incentive to do so to ¯rms that are not so young and yet
not old, because such ¯rms possess greater future surpluses than young ¯rms whose survivorships
are highly uncertain. That is, the monopoly power story by itself suggests that the di®erence in
the loan availability between a concentrated market and a competitive market should be more
pronounced for the not-so-young ¯rms than for young ¯rms. This is at odds with the evidence in
Petersen and Rajan (1995, p424).2
To construct an alternative theory for why the observed di®erences between di®erently con-
centrated markets can be consistent with rational choices, we abstract from any intertemporal
trade-o® by restricting the attention to a one-period ¯nancing problem. The alternative theory
1The measure of the loan market concentration in Petersen and Rajan (1995) is the Her¯ndahl index, which is
the sum of the banks' shares (squared) of deposits in the area. The loan availability is the frequency with which
a ¯rm utilizes the discount o®ered by trading partners to early repayments on trade credits, which measures the
opportunity cost of not having (or having not enough) bank loans.
2Petersen and Rajan (1995) avoided this unpleasant implication of their model by restricting ¯rms to live for
only two periods. A bank has no intertemporal trade-o® to make with a ¯rm in the last period of the life.
1stresses the informational problem that banks encounter in screening a project and consequently
bidding on the loan provision. In particular, there is one entrepreneur with a project whose
quality is unknown to the banks. Each bank decides the probability with which to screen the
project at a cost. The screening activity yields an informative but inaccurate signal about the
true quality of the project. Without knowing other banks' signals, each bank (including those
that did not screen) decides whether to submit a sealed bid and how much to bid on the loan
rate. The entrepreneur takes the lowest bid and carries out the project to reveal the outcome.
The loan availability can decrease with the number of banks. The culprit for this perverse de-
pendence is a negative informational externality. As a form of the winner's curse, this externality
arises because a bank's chance of winning the bidding game is greater when the project's quality
is bad than when the quality is good; thus winning increases the expectation that the quality is
bad and reduces the winning bank's expected pro¯t. This externality is stronger when there are
more banks, because winning against more banks that could have received a good signal (but did
not) greatly increases the expectation that the project is bad. Thus, when the number of banks
increases, each bank faces not only more potential competitors but also a worse negative infor-
mational externality. To cover the screening cost, each bank will reduce the screening probability
greatly and this negative intensive adjustment can outweigh the extensive increase in the number
of banks, making loans less available and the average loan rate higher.
For the above perverse result to occur, the screening cost must be low. A low screening cost
induces each bank to screen with a high probability, in which case there are su±ciently many
informed banks in bidding and an increase in the number of banks exacerbates the winner's curse
greatly. In contrast, when the screening cost is very high, most active bidders are uninformed.
Since winning against uninformed opponents does not yield any new information, the negative
informational externality to an informed winner is weak and increases only slightly with the
number of banks; the extensive e®ect of the increase in the number of banks dominates the
intensive e®ect and so the loan availability rises in this case.
21.1. Contributions to the literature
The main contribution of this paper is to formally establish the result that the negative infor-
mational externality in loan competition can be strong enough to generate a negative response
of the loan availability to an increase in the number of banks. This explanation for the observed
loan market behavior is complementary to the one provided by Petersen and Rajan (1995). The
emphasis on the fact that loan market competition reveals private information, albeit imperfectly,
separates this paper from standard screening models, such as Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Wang
and Williamson (1998), that have ignored the informational externality.
We are not the ¯rst to articulate the importance of the winner's curse in the loan market.
Broecker (1990) has examined how an increase in the number of banks a®ects each bank's will-
ingness to participate in the loan provision when banks exogenously receive signals about the
project's quality. Riordan (1993) uses a setup very similar to Broecker's but models the partic-
ipation choice di®erently.3 Thakor (1996) endogenizes banks' screening decisions and examines
the e®ect of capital requirements on the loan market. In contrast to our analysis, these papers
have not formally established that an increase in the number of banks can reduce the loan avail-
ability. What they have established is that an increase in the number of banks reduces each
bank's probability to provide a loan. This intensive adjustment does not necessarily translate
into a reduction in the loan availability at the aggregate level since the number of banks also
increases extensively. For the intensive e®ect to dominate the extensive e®ect, the presence of
more banks must su±ciently increase the negative informational externality through the winner's
curse. We show formally that this can occur when the screening cost is low.
Another contribution of our paper is to allow uninformed banks to bid, while the other papers
set the signal acquisition as a precondition for bidding. Such a requirement is unrealistic for the
loan market. First, it is di±cult to verify the amount of e®ort a bank puts into screening. Since
3Sha®er (1998) makes a further assumption that the loan rate is ¯xed and examines how loan provision decisions
a®ect the informational content in subsequent provisions to ¯rms that have not been funded. Rajan (1992) also
applies an auction model to loan provisions, but he focuses on a ¯rm's choice between borrowing from the incumbent
lender and the arm's length debt.
3uninformed banks are generally ones that have spent less e®ort in screening and obtained less
precise signals, it is di±cult to bar these banks from bidding. Second, in a dynamic extension of
the environment studied here, uninformed banks can learn from the market and partially free-ride
on informed banks' actions. Having not acquired a signal costly does not mean that a bank does
not want to bid. Even in the one-period environment here, we show that uninformed banks do
want to bid when the screening cost is high.
We also generate novel results by allowing uninformed banks to bid. First, the relationship
between the loan availability and the number of banks depends on the mix of informed and
uninformed banks in the market. The relationship is positive when uninformed banks bid as
well and so the pattern of the loan availability observed by Petersen and Rajan (1995) might
be speci¯c to their data set. Second, since the di®erential in the loan availability between areas
depends on the screening cost, it may be cyclical and industry-speci¯c (see section 5).
Finally, our analysis is related to the auction literature surveyed by McAfee and McMillan
(1987). The informational structure here is similar to that in Wang (1991). In contrast to
Wang's work, where bidders' information is exogenous and bidders always participate in bidding,
we examine banks' decisions on whether to obtain a signal and whether to participate in bidding.
Some other common-value auction models, such as Harstad (1990) and Levin and Smith (1994),
also examine agents' choices of obtaining a costly signal. They allow only those who receive a
signal to bid, use a continuous signal space and do not focus on the loan market.
2. The Environment
In this section we describe the model, delaying the discussions on modelling assumptions to
section 6. There are n ¸ 2 banks, indexed by i, and one entrepreneur. Both the banks and
the entrepreneur are risk-neutral, living for one period. The entrepreneur has one project to be
¯nanced with an investment normalized to one unit of goods but does not have any internal funds
and must resort to outside ¯nancing from the banks. If ¯nanced, the project yields output at the
end of period that can be consumed immediately. Output is publicly observable and depends on
4the quality of the project. The quality, denoted q, is either good (q = g) or bad (q = b). Output
is a(q)y where a(q) = 1 if q = g and 0 if q = b.
Banks do not know the project's true quality but have the following common prior:
q =
(
g; with prob. ® 2 (0;1);
b; with prob. 1 ¡ ®:
The entrepreneur may or may not know the true quality of the project. This is not important
in the current setting. Since the entrepreneur has no internal funds, under limited liability the
entrepreneur always likes to go ahead with the project if ¯nancing is obtained. The entrepreneur
contacts all banks in the market separately for the fund.
Banks can choose whether to screen the project. Denote the screening probability by p. It
costs c > 0 to screen, which yields a signal about the quality of the project. The signal, denoted
s, can be either g (good) or b (bad). Conditional on the true quality of the project, di®erent
screening banks' signals are independent draws from the same distribution:
sjq =
(
q; with prob. ° 2 (1=2;1);
q0 6= q; with prob. 1¡ °:
That is, with probability ° the signal is right and with probability 1¡° the signal is wrong. The
information is thus not accurate but, since ° > 1=2, the signal is more likely to be right than
wrong. The conditional distribution of the signal has the monotone likelihood ratio property or,
according to Milgrom and Weber (1982), the signal and the true quality are a±liated.4
Without knowing other banks' screening decisions or outcomes, each bank decides whether to
participate in loan competition. If a bank participates, it submits a sealed bid to the entrepreneur
at no cost. A bid speci¯es the percentage of output, denoted r, that the entrepreneur gives to
the bank if the project is successful. Because of limited liability, the entrepreneur gives the bank
nothing if the project is not successful. Similarly, a bank cannot ask the entrepreneur to give more
than what the project yields and so a bid is feasible if and only if r · 1. The loan rate implied by
r is ry¡1 and, for brevity, we will simply refer to r as the loan rate. A winning bid r generates a
4A density f has the monotone likelihood ratio property if for all s
0 > s and q





0jq)=f(sjq). In the current case, the ranking is g > b and so the property is equivalent to ° > 1=2.
5pro¯t a(q)yr¡1 to the bank and (1¡r)a(q)y to the entrepreneur.5 Clearly, the entrepreneur will
choose the lowest bid (the most aggressive bid). If there are two or more identical lowest bids,
the entrepreneur chooses one randomly with equal probability. Once ¯nanced, the entrepreneur
produces immediately and repays the loan if the project is good.
The screening e®ort is unobservable by outsiders. This is realistic since an entrepreneur is
likely to contact each bank separately for funds. The assumption also enables us to focus on
a symmetric equilibrium: Since banks bid without knowing the actual number of banks that
have screened, bids cannot directly depend on the realizations of other banks' signals but rather
on the screening probability. Screening is not a precondition for bidding, since an uninformed
bank can always pretend to be informed and bid. Thus, the screening cost is di®erent from the
participation cost in Harstad (1990) and Levin and Smith (1994).
The above loan competition is a common-value, ¯rst-price auction with sealed bids, where
\¯rst price" means that the lowest (most aggressive) loan rate wins. As in a typical common-value
auction model, the information structure has two features. First, a bank with a higher signal
has a higher expected value of the project than a bank with a lower signal. In particular, the




Pr(sjq) ¢ Pr(q) =
(
°® +(1 ¡°)(1 ¡®); if s = g;
(1 ¡°)® +°(1 ¡®); if s = b.
By Bayes' rule, the posterior for the project's success after observing s alone is





°®+(1¡°)(1¡®); if s = g;
(1¡°)®
(1¡°)®+°(1¡®); if s = b.
(2.1)
The posterior for q = b can be calculated similarly. Because ° > 1=2, Pr(q = gjs = g) > ® >
Pr(q = gjs = b) indeed. As veri¯ed later, this implies that a bank with signal g bids lower than
an uninformed bank that in turn bids lower than a bank with signal b.
Second, winning conveys information (Wilson (1977)) and the winner's curse arises. If a bank
wins the auction, it obtains information about other banks' signals and changes its assessment of
5Throughout this paper the pro¯t from bidding is the expected pro¯t that has not deducted the screening cost.
When the screening cost is deducted, we use the phrase \net pro¯t".
6the project. This is because banks' signals are dependent on each other unconditionally, although
they are independent conditional on the true quality of the project. For example, if a bank
receives signal b and bids according to this signal alone, the bid that makes a zero expected
pro¯t is r1 such that r1y ¢ Pr(q = gjs = b) = 1. If this bid wins, then all other banks must
have received signal b as well, since the bank would not have won if there were any bank with
signal g. Thus, the winner's information is I = fs1 = ::: = sn = bg and the expectation on the
project's success is much lower than the estimate based on the bank's own signal alone. That is,
Pr(q = gjI) < Pr(q = gjs = b). The bank's expected pro¯t conditional on I is negative with r1.
Anticipating the informational content of winning, a bank calculates the project's success
probability conditioning on both the bank's own signal and the outcome that its bid r wins. The
expected pro¯t from bidding r with a signal s, denoted ms(r), can be expressed as follows:
ms(r) = W(rjs) ¢[ry ¢ Pr(q = gjs; bid r wins) ¡ 1]; (2.2)
where W(rjA) is the winning probability for a bid r conditional on event A. Rewrite (2.2) as:6
ms(r) = Pr(q = gjs) (yr ¡ 1)W(rjq = g) ¡ Pr(q = bjs) W(rjq = b): (2.3)
The boxes highlight the terms where ms(r) di®ers between di®erent levels of s for a given r.
In contrast to many common-value auction models, the signals here are distributed in a
discrete space. The discrete signal space not only simpli¯es the analysis but also re°ects the
reality that information is usually coarse. Wang (1991) has analyzed this type of auction for
the case where the number of bidders is known. One result is that there cannot be a symmetric
equilibrium where all banks bid with pure strategies on the loan rate. The reason is simple.
6To derive the result, note that for any events A, B and C;




¤js; bid r wins)W(rjs) = Pr(q = q
¤; r wins js) = W(rjq = q
¤; s)Pr(q = q
¤js):
Finally, since signals are independent conditional on the true quality, the probability that a bid r wins conditional
on both the true quality and the bank's own signal is the same as that conditional on only the true quality. That
is, W(rjq;s) = W(rjq).
7Banks with signal g have incentive to under-bid each other. If each uses a pure strategy, the
competition drives their expected pro¯t to zero. But if the expected pro¯t is indeed zero then a
bank with signal g can bid slightly higher than other type g banks but lower than other types of
banks. This bid guarantees winning when all other banks have no signal or have signal b. Since
the latter event occurs with a strictly positive probability, the bid makes a positive pro¯t.
We will examine only symmetric equilibria where all banks screen with the same probability
and all banks that have the same information use the same strategies in participation and bidding.
A symmetric equilibrium will be such that each participating bank bids with a mixed strategy
over a range of bids. We characterize such equilibrium strategies below.
3. Strategies and Equilibrium
3.1. De¯nition and description
With symmetry, all banks choose a probability p to screen. After screening, there are three
di®erent types of banks. Let us refer to a bank as a bank G if it receives signal g, a bank B if
it receives signal b and a bank U (uninformed) if it did not screen. We extend the notation s to
include s = u to indicate that the bank did not screen, with Pr(qjs = u) = Pr(q). As shown later,
banks G always bid in equilibrium and so their participation probability is one. We summarize
the participation and bidding decisions in Table 1.
Table 1. Banks' participation and bidding strategies




cdf of bids Fg Fu Fb
support of cdf [rgL;rgH] [ruL;ruH] [rbL;rbH]
De¯nition 3.1. A symmetric equilibrium consists of the screening probability p, participation
probabilities (u;b), and bid distributions (Fg;Fu;Fb) such that the following conditions hold: (i)
Given p, the participationand bidding strategies maximize each bank's expectedpro¯t conditional
on the bank's signal; (ii) The screening probability maximizes the expected pro¯t from screening,
given that every other bank screens with probability p; and (iii) If 0 < p < 1, the expected pro¯t
8from screening equals the screening cost.












The part y > 1=® requires that, if all banks are uninformed, there are feasible loan rates to
¯nance a project and yield a non-negative pro¯t. The upper bound on y enables us to focus on
the most interesting case where the screening probability is less than one. This upper bound is
likely to be non-binding for typical loan markets because the bound increases exponentially with
nL. In any case this bound is only a convenient restriction and we analyzed the case where it is
violated in an earlier version of this paper (Cao and Shi (1999)). The restriction nL ¸ 3 ensures
that the interval for y in the above assumption is non-empty for all n ¸ nL.7
We analyze the bidding strategies ¯rst. Any of the bid distributions Fs (s = g;u;b) should
not have any mass point if its support is not a singleton. If Fg had a mass point at rm in its
support, for example, then by moving the mass slightly up or down around rm a bank G could
do better than bidding according to Fg. To ¯nd more about the bidding strategies, we calculate
the bank's expected payo® from (2.3) without additional knowledge of the relative location of the
supports of the three bid distributions. For s = g;b, denote




For s = u, denote Emu(r) = mu(r).
To calculate ms(r), we calculate W(rjq = g). This is the probability that a bid r wins when
the true quality of the project is g, without knowing the number of other banks participating in
bidding or whether they have screened. For any bid r 2 [0;1], it loses to an arbitrarily chosen
competitor in three cases: (i) The competitor screened, received a signal g and bid below r, the
probability of which is °pFg(r); (ii) The competitor did not screen, participated in bidding and





an additional case n = 2 that can be analyzed similarly but would require careful handling in algebra.
9bid below r, the probability of which is (1 ¡ p)uFu(r); (iii) The competitor screened, received
signal b, participated in bidding and bid below r, the probability of which is (1¡°)pbFb(r). Thus,
a bid r loses to an arbitrary competitor with probability °pFg(r)+(1¡p)uFu(r)+(1¡°)pbFb(r).
For the bid to win against n ¡1 potential competitors, the probability is
W(rjq = g) ´ [1 ¡°pFg(r) ¡(1 ¡p)uFu(r) ¡(1 ¡°)pbFb(r)]n¡1: (3.2)
Similarly, when the true quality of the project is b, the winning probability of a bid r is
W(rjq = b) ´ [1 ¡(1 ¡°)pFg(r)¡ (1¡ p)uFu(r)¡ °pbFb(r)]n¡1: (3.3)
Substituting these probabilities into (2.3), we obtain the expected payo® ms(r).
An important feature of the payo® function is that the ratio Pr(q = gjs)=Pr(q = bjs) is
increasing in s, where s is ranked according to g > u > b. That is, the assessment of the project's
success is higher for a bank G than for a bank U, which in turn is higher than for a bank B. If
there are bids for a bank U to make a non-negative pro¯t, a bank G can under-bid slightly, win
the bidding and obtain a greater expected pro¯t. The similar comparison holds between a bank
B and a bank U. Thus, a bank G's bids are higher than a bank U's, which in turn are higher
than a bank B's. More precisely, we have (see Appendix A for a proof):
Lemma 3.2. rgH = ruL if u > 0; ruH = rbL if b > 0.
The lemma implies Fg(r) > Fb(r) for any bid r below the highest bid. From (3.2) and (3.3)
one can immediately verify the following result:
Lemma 3.3. W(rjq = b) > W(rjq = g) for any bid r below the highest bid and the ratio
W(rjq = b)=W(rjq = g) is an increasing function of n for given (p;u;b;Fs).
This lemma highlights the negative information externality in loan competition. First, it is
more likely for a bid to win when the true quality is bad than when the true quality is good.
Thus, a bank's assessment of the project decreases when it wins. Anticipating this winner's curse,
10each bank has lower incentive to screen. We refer to this as an externality because it depends
on other banks' screening and bidding decisions that are taken as given by each individual bank.
More important, the externality is exacerbated by the increase in the number of banks in the
market. When there are more potential competitors, the chance for a bank to win the bidding
when the quality of the project is good relative to that when the quality of the project is bad
is much smaller and so, if the bank wins, the bank must greatly reduce its expectation that the
project is of good quality. As shown later, this negative informational externality induces a large
reduction in the screening probability in response to an increase in the number of banks.
3.2. Banks B's and U's strategies
With Lemma 3.2, we can show that banks B will not bid. To see why, note that a bank B
can possibly win only when all other banks are banks B as well, i.e., when all other banks have
screened and received signal B. If such a bank makes a non-negative pro¯t, an uninformed bank
can make a positive expected pro¯t and hence will bid with probability one, i.e., u = 1. But if
banks G and U always bid, then the probability for a bank B to win in the bad state relative
to that in the good state, W(rjq = b)=W(rjq = g), is too high for any feasible bid to make a
non-negative expected pro¯t under Assumption 1.
Similarly, it is not feasible for a bank U to bid with probability one. Uninformed banks
participate in bidding with a positive probability when the screening probability p is small enough
















Appendix B contains a proof for the following proposition:
Proposition 3.4. Assume p > 0. Banks B do not bid. Uninformed banks bid if and only if
p < pA(n), in which case they bid with probability u(p;n) < 1 and bid according to the cdf Fu

















and the inverse of Fu, Hu(F), is given by








1¡ (1¡ °)p ¡(1¡ p)uF
1 ¡ °p ¡(1 ¡p)uF
¶n¡1#
: (3.7)
Uninformed banks make zero expected pro¯t. Their participation probability decreases with p
and their lowest bid increases with p.
The reason why a bank U's participation rate decreases with and their lowest bid increases
with other banks' screening probability is as follows. When each bank screens with a higher
probability, it is more likely that at least one bank receives signal g and hence less likely that
an uninformed bank wins. The expected pro¯t of banks U from bidding is lower for any given
participation rate. If an uninformed bank wins despite the low likelihood, the bank's expectation
of the project's success must be low. This further reduces the expected pro¯t for a bank U. To
break even, such a bank bids with a lower probability and bids more pessimistically.
The density F0
u(r) is a decreasing function, which can be veri¯ed from (3.7) by showing
H00
u(F) > 0. That is, a bank U's bids are concentrated at the lower end of the support. This is
because a higher winning bid makes a higher pro¯t and so, for the mixing strategy to be rational,
a higher bid must be less likely to win. This is achieved by having more banks bid at low levels.
3.3. Banks G's strategies
Since b = 0 and Fu(rgH) = 0, the expected payo® to a bank G from bidding r 2 [rgL;rgH] is
mg(r) = EMg=Pr(s = g), where
EMg = (yr ¡1)®°[1¡ °pFg(r)]n¡1 ¡(1 ¡®)(1¡ °)[1 ¡ (1 ¡°)pFg(r)]n¡1
= (yrgH ¡ 1)®°(1 ¡°p)n¡1 ¡(1 ¡®)(1¡ °)[1 ¡ (1 ¡ °)p]n¡1:
Using the two equalities we can solve for the inverse of the bid distribution Fg. Also, the payo®
is an increasing function of rgH. Thus, rgH = 1 if banks U do not bid (p ¸ pA(n)) and rgH = ruL
12if banks U bid (p < pA(n)). For a bank G to bid, as we have maintained so far, the above pro¯t
















Assumption 1 ensures pH(n) 2 (0;1) and pH(n) > pA(n). Similarly to Proposition 3.4, we can
prove the following proposition (the proof is omitted):
Proposition 3.5. Suppose that all other banks screen with probability p 2 [0;pH(n)). A bank
G bids with probability 1. Its expected pro¯t from bidding is mg = EMg=Pr(s = g), the bid
distribution is Fg with an inverse Hg, and the support is [rgL;rgH], where
EMg(p;n) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
(1¡ ®)(2° ¡ 1)[1 ¡(1 ¡°)p]n¡1; if 0 < p < pA(n)
(y ¡ 1)®°(1 ¡°p)n¡1
¡(1 ¡®)(1 ¡°)[1¡ (1¡ °)p]n¡1;




ruL(p;n); if 0 < p < pA(n);
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The expected pro¯t of a bank G is positive for all p < pH(n) and is a decreasing function of p.
There are a number of notable features. First, in contrast to a bank U, a bank G makes a
positive expected pro¯t conditional on its signal, even when the bid is arbitrarily close to but
lower than a bank U's lowest bid. This is simply because a bank G's assessment on the project's
success is higher than a bank U's and the expected pro¯t is conditional on each bank's own
signal. When the signal becomes uninformative (i.e., when ° ! 1=2), the di®erence between the
assessments by the two types of banks vanishes and a bank G's expected pro¯t goes to zero.
Second, the lowest bid by a bank G, rgL, is higher than the bid that a bank G would bid if
it were known that other banks all had signal g. This is because a bank does not know other
13banks' signals and other banks receive signal b with a positive probability. Even bidding at rgL
makes a positive expected pro¯t mg. In fact, rgL is the supremum among such bids that bidding
below them, which guarantees winning, will make an expected pro¯t less than mg.
Third, like F0
u, the density F0
g(r) is a decreasing function and so a lower bid is compensated
by a higher chance of winning to generate the same expected pro¯t as that from a higher bid.
Finally, a bank G's expected pro¯t is a decreasing function of the screening probability used
by other banks. This is intuitive. As every other bank increases the screening probability, there
are more banks that receive signal g and the ensuing competition drives down the pro¯t from
bidding. Similarly, for any given screening probability, a bank G's expected pro¯t is a decreasing
function of the number of banks in the market.
3.4. Equilibrium
Now we determine the screening probability. To do so, let us calculate the unconditionally
expected pro¯t of a bank that screens (i.e., before the signal is revealed). Since receiving signal
b yields zero expected pro¯t, the unconditionally expected pro¯t is Pr(s = g) ¢ mg = EMg. The
net expected pro¯t from screening is EMg ¡ c. An individual bank's screening probability, say





= 1; if EMg(p;n) > c
= 0; if EMg(p;n) < c
2 [0;1]; if EMg(p;n) = c:
(3.13)
The equilibrium screening probability is such that p¤(p;n) = p. Since EMg(p;n) is a decreasing
function of p, the screening probability is unique, as shown in Figure 1 by point E.
De¯ne cA = EMg(pA(n);n) and c0 = EMg(0;n) = (1 ¡ ®)(2° ¡ 1). Note that p < pA(n) if
and only if c > cA. The following proposition becomes evident.
Proposition 3.6. Under Assumption 1, a unique equilibrium exists as follows:
(i) If c ¸ c0, then p = 0 and all banks bid 1=(®y), making zero expected pro¯t;
(ii) If 0 < c < c0, then p 2 (0;pH(n)) and p satis¯es EMg(p;n) = c. The screening probability
is a decreasing function of the screening cost. Banks G always bid and make a positive expected
14pro¯t from bidding. Uninformed banks bid if and only if c > cA, in which case they bid with
probability u(p;n) > 0 and make a zero expected pro¯t. Banks B do not bid. The bids are
characterized in Propositions 3.4 and 3.5.
Remark 1. Even when c = 0, each bank screens with a probability pH that is strictly less than
one. This is because of the limited liability and because a bank's expected pro¯t from bidding
decreases su±ciently in other banks' screening probability as a result of the winner's curse.
 c0 banks U
EMg(p) participate
in bidding
 A banks U
 cA do not bid
             E
  c
  increase
    in n
    0 pA           pH        p
Figure 1 Equilibrium screening probability
4. Loan Rates and Loan Market Tightness
The e®ects of the screening cost and the number of banks on loans depend on whether the project
is good or bad. We focus on the case q = g in the remainder of this paper, because the distortion
created by the informational problem on the ¯nancing of a good project is the one that is socially
costly.8 Also, assume 0 < c < c0 and so p > 0.
8The case q = b can be analyzed similarly, but some integrals do not admit reduced form solutions.
154.1. De¯nitions
We denote the loan market tightness for a good project by Tg and measure it by the probability
with which the project fails to get ¯nanced. A higher Tg means a tighter loan market. To calculate
Tg, note that it is the probability that no bid is submitted when the quality is good (but unknown
to the banks). Conditional on q = g, there are two cases where a randomly selected bank bids:
when it screens and receives signal g, the probability of which is °p, or when it does not screen
and chooses to bid, the probability of which is (1¡p)u. Thus, a randomly selected bank will bid
with probability °p +(1 ¡p)u. For every bank not to bid, the probability is:
Tg = [1¡ °p ¡(1 ¡p)u]n: (4.1)
The e®ects of an increase in c or n on loan rates are complicated. The change directly a®ects
loan rates as well as indirectly through the e®ect on the screening probability. There is very
little hope that such an change will in general a®ect loan rates monotonically in the sense of the
¯rst-order stochastic dominance. To obtain concrete results, we focus on the expected loan rate.
Let Rg be the expected loan rate that the entrepreneur gets when the project's quality is good.
We calculate it as follows. First, consider the case p < pA(n) and calculate the joint probability
with which the project receives at least one bid and the winning bid does not exceed a level
r1 2 [rgL;rgH]. Given q = g, a randomly selected bank participates in bidding and its bid is lower
than or equal to r1 with probability °pFg(r1). Then [1¡°pFg(r1)]n is the probability with which
no bid below or equal to r1 is received and 1¡ [1¡ °pFg(r1)]n is the probability with which the
project receives at least one bid below or equal to r1. Since the project may not receive any bid
at all, which occurs with probability Tg, the observed winning bid does not exceed r1 2 [rgL;rgH]
with the following probability:
1
1¡ Tg
f1 ¡ [1 ¡°pFg(r1)]ng:
The similar probability for the observed winning bid not to exceed r1 2 [ruL;1] is
1
1 ¡Tg
f1 ¡[1 ¡°p ¡ (1 ¡ p)uFu(r1)]ng:
16Therefore, the expected value of observed loan rates when q = g (converted back to the expecta-
tion of yr ¡1) is









rdf1 ¡[1 ¡°p ¡ (1 ¡ p)uFu(r)]ng
¾
:
Substituting r = Hg(F) into the ¯rst integral and r = Hu(F) into the second integral from
Propositions 3.4 and 3.5, we can integrate to obtain:
Rg =
cnp + (1 ¡®)f1 ¡[1 ¡(1 ¡°)p ¡(1 ¡p)u]ng
®f1 ¡ [1 ¡ °p ¡(1 ¡p)u]ng
: (4.2)
If p ¸ pA(n), a similar derivation shows that Rg obeys (4.2) with u = 0.
4.2. E®ects of a higher screening cost
The expected loan rate and the loan market tightness depend on the screening cost as follows
(see Appendix C for a proof):
Proposition 4.1. The loan market tightness is an increasing function of the screening cost when
c < cA and a decreasing function of the screening cost when c > cA. The expected loan rate
Rg increases with the screening cost when c < c¤, where c¤ 2 (cA;c0), and decreases with the
screening cost when c is close to c0.
The loan market tightness has a hump-shaped dependence on the screening cost. When
c < cA, only banks G bid. As the screening cost increases, the expected number of bidding banks
falls because each bank screens with a lower probability. This generates a tighter loan market.
When c passes the level cA, further increases in the screening cost induce banks U to bid as well
and so loans become more available (though more costly).
The dependence of the expected loan rate on the screening cost has a similar hump shape,
although the peak of the e®ect occurs at a higher level c¤ > cA. When c < cA, the expected
loan rate increases with c because only banks G bid and a higher loan rate is required to cover
17the higher screening cost. In this case, the higher screening cost increases the winning bid in the
sense of the ¯rst-order stochastic dominance. Banks G's bids continue to increase with c when
c > cA but the response of the average loan rate is complicated by the participation of banks U.
When cA < c < c¤, there are not many banks U in bidding and, since their bids are higher than
those by banks G, their participation makes the expected loan rate increase even faster than in
the case c < cA. When c > c¤, most active banks are uninformed. Further increases in c increase
competition among these banks and hence reduce the average loan rate.
Example 4.2. ® = 0:65, ° = 0:7, y = 1:89, n = 6. These parameters satisfy Assumption 1. In
this case, the highest screening cost that induces positive screening is c0 = 0:14. Figure 2a depicts
the screening probability of each bank and bank U's participation probability; Figure 2b depicts
the loan market tightness and the expected loan rate. As discussed above, when c increases, p
falls, u increases and the graphs of (Tg;Rg) both have a hump shape.9
Figures 2a and 2b here.
These e®ects of the screening cost show that, for any given number of banks, two economies
can be quite di®erent in the screening cost and yet exhibit similar loan market characteristics such
as the average loan rate and the loan market tightness. In one economy, the active bidders are all
informed and have high valuations of the project. In the other economy, most active bidders are
uninformed and whose chance of winning is often spoiled by a few informed bidders. Although
these two economies have similar market characteristics, they have opposite responses to policies
that reduce the screening cost. With informed bidders (the ¯rst economy), the policy reduces
the market tightness and lowers the loan rate by increasing the number of informed bidders.
With mostly uninformed bidders (the second economy), the policy also increases the number of
informed bidders but it has a much greater adverse e®ect on the number of uninformed bidders,
leading to a tighter market and a higher expected loan rate. The economy with informed bidders
has more dispersed loan rates than the economy with mostly uninformed bidders.
9Although expected loan rates appear large in the ¯gure, they are clearly reasonable if each period is interpreted
as, say, 5 years.
18Therefore, it is ambiguous whether a policy that only reduces the screening cost moderately
can improve competition among banks in providing cheaper and more available loans. An unam-
biguous measure of increased competition when the screening cost is lower is that the expected
pro¯t is lower for banks, but this would be di±cult to measure empirically. There is a sense,
however, that a signi¯cant reduction in the screening cost can increase competition by reducing
the loan rate, since the expected loan rate is lower when the screening cost is close to zero than
when the cost is high (see Figure 2b).
4.3. E®ects of increasing the number of banks
We now turn to the in°uence of the number of banks on the loan rate and the loan market
tightness. Appendix D contains a proof for the following Proposition:
Proposition 4.3. For any ¯xed c 2 (0;c0), the equilibrium screening probability is a decreasing
function of the number of banks. The loan market tightness is an increasing function of n if and
only if c < c¤¤, where c¤¤ ¸ cA.
The equilibrium screening probability decreases in n because, for any given p 2 [0;pH], the
expected screening pro¯t of a bank G is a decreasing function of n. To cover the screening cost,
each bank's screening probability must fall when n increases. In Figure 1, the increase in n shifts
the EMg(p) curve down and produces a smaller solution for p.
The most interesting feature is that the loan market can become tighter when there are more
banks, as in the case c < c¤¤. This seemingly paradoxical result arises because an increase in
the number of banks, by reducing the screening probability, reduces the expected number of
bidding banks intensively by more than the extensive increase in the number of banks. The
dominating intensive e®ect is a manifestation of the negative informational externality to the
winner documented in Lemma 3.3. That is, an increase in the number of banks reduces a bank
G's expected pro¯t below the level which conventional competition would produce. This calls for
a large reduction in the screening probability that makes the market tighter.
19To illustrate, let us consider the case c < cA (< c¤¤) and rewrite
EMg(p;n) = (1 ¡°p)n¡1 ¢®°
(








The conventional competition e®ect of an increased n is captured by the term (1¡°p)n¡1, which
is the probability that the bid rgH wins when the true quality is good. An increase in n reduces
this winning probability for any given p > 0 and hence calls for a reduction in p to cover the
screening cost. The additional e®ect, i.e. the informational externality, works through the term
[:]n¡1 in (4.3), which is the relative likelihood of winning when the true project is bad as opposed
to when the quality is good. For any given p > 0, an increase in n increases this relative likelihood
and hence reduces the expected pro¯t. This additional e®ect calls for a further reduction in the
screening probability and increases the loan market tightness.
The negative informational externality increases with banks' screening probability. When no
one screens and every bidder is uninformed, winning does not yield any new information and hence
the winner's curse is absent. When each bank screens with a higher probability, the expected
number of banks with signal g is higher and so, for any given bid, the chance of winning against a
randomly selected bank when the true quality is good falls relative to that when the true quality
is bad. Winning in this case yields more negative information about the project's quality and the
content of this information is more responsive to changes in n. More precisely, the derivative of
the term [:]n¡1 in (4.3) with respect to n is an increasing function of p.
An implication is that the negative informational externality is weaker when uninformed
banks bid than when they do not. When u > 0, an increase in n does not increase the negative
informational externality by as much as when u = 0. Moreover, the increase in the number of
uninformed bidders itself eases the loan market tightness. Therefore, when c > c¤¤, increases in
n may not increase the market tightness. In fact, when c is su±ciently large, most bidders are
uninformed and so the negative informational externality to an informed winner is dominated by
other forces described above. In this case, the loan market becomes less tight when n increases.
Another implication is that the loan market will never approach a standard competitive one:
20Corollary 4.4. Let c = 0. Then u = 0 and p = pH 2 (0;1). Moreover, limn!1 Tg 2 (0;1) and
limn!1 Rg > 0.
The proof for this proposition is straightforward and hence is omitted. The proposition states
that even when there is no screening cost and when there are in¯nitely many banks, a good
project is not always ¯nanced and the average loan rate is not zero. This is because, as the
number of banks increases, the negative externality increases to reduce each bank's screening
probability su±ciently so that the expected number of banks in the limit, limn!1 np, is bounded
above. This result is similar to the one in Broecker (1990, proposition 2.3).
In comparison to the e®ect on the market tightness, the e®ects of an increase in the number of
banks on the expected loan rate are more di±cult to detail analytically. Our conjecture is that an
increase in the number of banks increases the expected loan rate when the screening cost is low
and decreases the expected loan rate when the screening cost is high. The following numerical
examples support this conjecture. These examples di®er in the level of the screening cost but
have the same values of (®;°;y) as in Example 4.2. The lowest value of n is nL = 3, the highest
value is nH = 15, and c0 = 0:14.
Example 4.5. Low screening cost: c = 0:056. Figure 3a shows the equilibrium screening prob-
ability, the market tightness and the expected loan rate. Figure 3b shows the distribution of the
winning bids for n = nL and nH, denoted FWg(¢;n;c) for given (n;c).
Figures 3a and 3b here.
In this example, the screening cost is so low that all bidders are informed ones. As the number
of banks increases, each bank reduces the screening probability and the loan market gets tighter.
The lowest bid rgL does not change with n since it is pinned down by the screening cost (setting
EMg = c in (3.11)). The highest bid does not change with n either since it is 1. However, the
density of bids is more concentrated at high bids when n is larger since fewer banks bid. The
winning bid distribution with a higher n dominates that with a smaller n (see Figure 3b).
21Example 4.6. High screening cost: c = 0:119. Figure 4a shows the equilibrium screening prob-
ability, the participation probability of a bank U, the market tightness and the expected loan
rate. Figure 4b shows the distribution of the winning bids for n = nL and nH.
Figures 4a and 4b here.
In this example, the screening cost is su±ciently high that most bidders are uninformed.
Again, the increase in the number of banks reduces each bank's screening probability by reducing
the expected pro¯t from screening. The increased number of banks also increases competition
among uninformed banks and so the participation rate u falls. Despite this reduction in the
participation probability, the total number of uninformed banks in bidding increases with n,
leading to a less tight loan market.
On loan rates, the increases in the number of banks, by reducing the screening probability,
increases banks G's bids as in the previous example. But banks U's bids decrease. Shown in
Figure 4b, an increase in n tilts the distribution of the winning bids submitted by banks G
toward higher bids and tilts the distribution of the winning bids submitted by banks U toward
lower bids, producing the bulging shape in the middle of the winning bid distribution. The overall
e®ect on the expected loan rate is ambiguous in general but, for the current example, it is negative
as shown in Figure 4a. Since the winning bids are more concentrated in the middle with a higher
n, the standard deviation of the winning bids is likely to fall.
Example 4.7. Moderate screening cost: c = 0:098. Figure 5a shows the equilibrium screening
probability, the participation probability of a bank U, the market tightness and the expected loan
rate. Figure 5b shows the distribution of the winning bids for n = nL and nH.
Figures 5a and 5b here.
In this example, increases in the number of banks change the nature of the equilibrium. For
n < 9, the screening probability is high, which deters uninformed banks from participating in
bidding. In this case, the loan market tightness and the expected loan rate behave very like those
22in Example 4.5. For n > 9, the screening probability is low, uninformed banks bid and, as in
Example 4.6, the loan market becomes less tight when n increases. In contrast to Example 4.6,
the participation probability by uninformed banks increases with n. Also, the expected loan rate
increases with n, because the number of banks U in bidding is not signi¯cant and so their reduced
bids are not su±cient to outweigh the increased bids by banks G. The distribution of the winning
bids when n is higher dominates the one when n is lower (see Figure 5b).
5. Implications
Implication 1: It is possible that a market with fewer banks can provide both a lower loan rate
and a higher loan availability than a market with more banks.
Proposition 4.3 established this result analytically and Figure 3a illustrated it with an ex-
ample. The result is consistent with empirical ¯ndings by Petersen and Rajan (1995). As in
Petersen and Rajan (1995), this implication in turn implies the following:
Implication 2: The average \quality" of projects ¯nanced in a concentrated banking area is
lower than in a competitive banking area when the screening cost is low (see Proposition
4.3), where the meaning of \quality" di®ers from that in previous sections and refers to the
prior probability of project success, ®.
To verify Implication 2, one can show that the iso-tightness condition, Tg = constant, induces
a positive relationship between n and ® when c < c¤¤. That is, a market with a higher n and a
higher ® funds the same number of projects as a market with a lower n and a lower ®. Intuitively,
when ® increases, a bank G's expected pro¯t increases for any given screening probability and
so the zero net-pro¯t condition requires the screening probability to increase. This reduces the
market tightness for any given n. To maintain a constant tightness the number of banks must
increase, since the tightness is an increasing function of n in this case. This negative relationship
between ® and n along the iso-tightness curve says that, given any expected number of projects
23that are ¯nanced, the average quality of the projects (measured by ®) is lower in an area that
has a smaller number of banks if c < c¤¤.
Implication 3: An increase in the number of banks is likely to have a greater e®ect on the market
tightness than on the expected loan rate.
In Examples 4.5 and 4.6, the market tightness responds to n signi¯cantly but the expected
loan rate remains °at. Only in Example 4.7 and only for n large enough does the increase in n
have a noticeable e®ect on the expected loan rate. The response of the expected loan rate is small
because, when a bank responds to an increase in n, it changes both the participation probability
and the bids; these two have opposite e®ects on the expected loan rate. This result suggests
that the loan availability is a more important channel through which banks compete against each
other when information is incomplete.10
Our model also has its unique implications, listed below. Some of these implications also
suggest empirical interpretations of the screening cost.
Implication 4: The di®erential in the loan availability between a concentrated banking area and
a competitive area can be lower for not-so-young ¯rms than for young ¯rms.
Figures 6a and 6b here.
As we argued in the introduction, the monopoly power story by Petersen and Rajan (1995)
suggests that the loan availability di®erential between di®erently concentrated areas should be
even greater for not-so-young (but not-old) ¯rms than for young ¯rms. Our model can generate
the opposite but realistic pattern, although our model does not have an explicit intertemporal
structure. One way to do this is to interpret the parameter ® as a proxy for a ¯rm's age, since a
¯rm's good quality is increasingly revealed to the public when the ¯rm's survivorship increases.
10Our model also implies that a lower expected loan rate often, but not always, indicates a less tight loan market
(see Example 4.7).
24Consider the example where ° = 0:7, y = 1:89, c = 0:072, n1 = 4, and n2 = 10. We depict
the pattern of the market tightness in Figure 6a. As ® increases from 0:6 to 0:8, the tightness
is ¯rst lower with n1 ¯rms than with n2 ¯rms and then the pattern is reversed. Eventually, the
tightness levels in the two markets decrease toward the same level.11
One may also argue that the bank's screening cost falls when a ¯rm becomes more established.
To see how the di®erential in the loan availability between di®erent banking areas changes with
the ¯rm's age under this interpretation, reconsider Example 4.2 for a competitive banking area
(n = 10) and a concentrated banking area (n = 4). Figure 6b illustrates the di®erence in the loan
market tightness between these two areas for all values of c that induce a tighter loan market for
the competitive area (i.e., for c < 0:099). The ¯gure shows that this di®erence narrows when the
screening cost decreases, as long as the two areas both start with only informed banks in bidding
(i.e., as long as c < 0:091). When 0:091 < c < 0:099, the di®erence in the tightness increases when
c falls, because the competitive area has many uninformed banks in bidding initially which are
driven out by the lower screening cost. Thus, unless the two areas di®er initially in the nature of
the equilibrium, the di®erential in the loan availability between the two areas is larger for young
¯rms than for not-so-young ¯rms.
Implication 5: The relationship between the loan availability and the number of banks is not
invariably negative and the nature of this relationship is industry-speci¯c.
The market tightness increases with n when the screening cost is low and decreases with
n when the screening cost is high (Proposition 4.3). Since the screening cost depends on the
industry's type, the relationship between the loan availability and the number of banks varies
across industries. For example, it might be easier for banks to estimate the expected pro¯t from
running a McDonald's franchise than to estimate the pro¯t from developing the next cutting-edge
computers. Our model indicates that the loan availability di®erential between a concentrated
area and a competitive area is greater for the ¯rst type of industry than for the second type.
11Another proxy for a ¯rm's age is the project's productivity y: When a ¯rm becomes established, the productivity
increases. This alternative interpretation of age leads to outcomes similar to those caused by an increase in ®.
25In contrast, the model by Petersen and Rajan (1995) predicts the opposite if the cutting-edge
computer industry also has a higher expected future pro¯t than the McDonald's franchise.
The link between the industry type and the screening cost is supported by some evidence in
Petersen and Rajan (1995). In their sample, a majority of ¯rms are in retail and service sectors.
For example, the most concentrated banking areas have more than 60% of the ¯rms in these
sectors. Since the screening cost is lower for such sectors than for other sectors in the sample
like construction, manufacturing and transportation, Implication 5 indicates that their sample
is biased toward a strong negative relationship between the loan availability and the number of
banks. The relationship should be weaker once the industry type is controlled. This is exactly
what Petersen and Rajan (1995) found: When they added the two-digit industry classi¯cation
into their regression, the dependence of the loan availability on bank concentration fell. Of course,
to satisfactorily test the role of the industry type, one needs more detailed industry classi¯cation
than the two-digit one.
Implication 6: If economic upturns make information much cheaper than in downturns, then
the loan availability di®erential between a concentrated banking area and a competitive
banking area is pro-cyclical.
This implication again derives from the observation that the loan availability di®erential be-
tween the two areas is negative when the screening cost is high and positive otherwise (Proposition
4.3). Thus, if economic upturns change the economy from one with a high screening cost to an-
other with a low screening cost, then the loan availability di®erential changes from a negative
one to a positive one and hence is pro-cyclical. In this case, economic recoveries bene¯t small
businesses in concentrated banking areas more than those in competitive banking areas.
There is a good reason to believe that economic upturns reduce the information cost. If di®er-
ent ¯rms' productivities have a common unknown component as well as idiosyncratic ones, eco-
nomic upturns reveal the common component more accurately through high aggregate activities
than economic downturns. This argument has been formalized in the literature of informational
26business cycles, e.g., Chamley and Gale (1994). In contrast, it is not clear how the di®erence
between banks' monopoly powers in di®erent areas would change over business cycles. Unfortu-
nately, the data in Petersen and Rajan (1995) involves a very short time span (1988¡1989) and
hence cannot be used to check the business cycle features of the loan availability di®erential.12
6. Modelling Assumptions and Robustness
We can relax some assumptions in our model without a®ecting the qualitative results. First, there
is no cost submitting a bid in our model, but all the results are robust to the introduction of a
small bidding cost. Second, banks' signals are independent, conditional on the true quality of the
project. The qualitative results will survive when signals are correlated, since the general property
required for the results is that the signals are a±liated (see Milgrom and Weber (1982)). Third,
there is only one screening technology in our model. One can add another screening technology
that costs less (say, ca < c) and yields a less precise signal (say, °a < °). If ca is su±ciently small
and °a is close to 1=2, some banks may use this screening technology and their participation
choices will be very much like the ones we analyzed for uninformed banks in previous sections.
This provides another justi¯cation for our earlier assumption that uninformed banks can bid:
Those uninformed banks are meant to be banks that choose an inferior but less costly screening
technology; as long as the screening e®ort cannot be veri¯ed, they can compete in loan provisions.
Another simplifying assumption in our paper is the one-period environment. We have used a
one-period model deliberately to emphasize the informational externality. With multiple periods,
a lending bank may gain private information about the project from the relationship and hence
may have informational monopoly power in subsequent periods. Sharpe (1990) and von Thadden
(1998) have analyzed banks' lending decisions in this environment. In particular, Thadden (1998)
has shown that the informational externality continues to play an important role in loan com-
petition. In fact, by allowing uninformed banks to bid against informed ones, we have already
12Our model also allows for the possibility that, for medium screening cost, loans are less available in the not-so-
competitive market than in both the highly concentrated and the highly competitive markets (see Example 4.7).
This result, documented in Petersen and Rajan (1995) (pp428-431), is inconsistent with their story that relies on
ex post monopoly power.
27incorporated a similar type of asymmetry between banks at the bidding stage. For this reason,
we expect our main results to hold in subsequent periods with asymmetric banks.13 Nevertheless,
such an extension will nicely integrate the information-externality story in this paper and the
monopoly-power story in Petersen and Rajan (1995). Also, anticipating the lending bank's ex
post monopoly power, the borrower may want to seek alternative sources of ¯nancing such as
arm's-length debts (Rajan (1992)).
It is more di±cult to relax some other assumptions. One of these is the absence of collu-
sion among banks. If banks can collude more easily in a concentrated banking area than in a
competitive banking area, then collusion will reduce the di®erential between average loan rates
in these two areas. Although we do not know a tractable way to model collusion with private
information, we want to make two remarks. First, the collusion bias is not unique to our model;
the monopoly power story by Petersen and Rajan (1995) has the same bias. Second, although
banks might want to collude to raise the loan rate, it is unlikely that they want to change the
loan availability in a systematic way. Thus, the relationship between the loan availability and the
number of banks is likely to survive collusion among banks.
Another important assumption in our paper is that the borrower contacts all banks for loans
or, more generally, that the number of banks contacted by the borrower before obtaining a loan
is an increasing function of the total number of banks in the area. This assumption is in contrast
with the result in Thakor (1996), who shows that the optimal number of banks that the borrower
contacts may be independent of the total number of banks in the area. However, Thakor's model,
like the current version of ours, has only one borrower. Our assumption is intended for a realistic
market which has many borrowers. When many borrowers compete against each other for loans,
each faces the danger of being left out and of being perceived in the subsequent periods as one
that has a much worse credit worthiness than the pool of borrowers in the ¯rst period. Without
coordination among borrowers, it is optimal for each borrower to contact as many banks as
13Like other bidding models discussed in subsection 1.1, Sharpe (1990) and von Thadden (1998) have assumed
that signals arrive costlessly. By endogenizing the screening decision, one can extend our analysis to incorporate
banks that acquire di®erent information over time.
28possible.
Even without the above assumption and with only one borrower, the winner's curse will work
similarly if the borrower applies for a loan sequentially. Suppose, for example, that the borrower
contacts only one bank at a time and that the project's true quality is good. The ¯rst bank that
the borrower contacts has incentive not to make an o®er immediately. This is because the bank
is concerned that its own signal may be too optimistic; if it waits to observe other banks' funding
decisions, the bank can obtain additional information about the project. For the same reason,
even if the ¯rst bank decides to make an o®er immediately, it has incentive to o®er a very high
loan rate. In both cases the borrower is unlikely to get a desirable loan from the ¯rst bank it
contacts. If there are more banks, the ¯rst bank is more reluctant to make an o®er immediately;
When it makes an o®er, it o®ers a higher loan rate and so the borrower contacts more banks
before getting a satisfactory loan. This informational externality, similar to ours, makes the loan
availability possibly decrease with the number of banks in the area.
7. Conclusion
The mere presence of more banks in a market does not imply more available and cheaper loans.
The active participation of more banks in loan provisions does. Whether a bank chooses to
participate in loan provisions depends on the expected pro¯t from such participation. When
banks can obtain private information about the project's quality by screening, this pro¯t can fall
greatly as the number of banks increases, because the presence of more banks greatly increases the
negative informational externality through the winner's curse. Therefore, in a market with more
banks, each bank's screening probability can be much lower and the number of active competitors
can be smaller, making loans less available and the expected loan rate higher than in a market
with just a few banks. This is the case when the screening cost is low.
Although this result rationalizes the empirical ¯nding by Petersen and Rajan (1995), we do
not view the presence of more banks as the cause of inadequate ¯nancing for small businesses.
Rather, other characteristics of the loan market are more important. In particular, we have shown
29that the relationship between the loan availability and the number of banks can be reversed if the
screening cost is high. Policies should be geared toward changing these characteristics in order to
improve the loan market performance. For example, a su±cient subsidy to screening can reduce
the loan rate and make more good projects ¯nanced.
Our analysis also has other novel implications, listed in section 5. It will be interesting to test
these implications in future researches and, in particular, to test the implication that the loan
availability di®erential between di®erently concentrated areas is cyclical and industry-speci¯c.
An interesting theoretical exercise is to extend the model to a market with many borrowers and
multiple periods. In this general environment, banks may o®er more complicated mechanisms to
borrowers than a simple rationing scheme and a loan rate. It is a challenge to characterize this
mechanism design problem with competing designers (banks), since some convenient devices such
as the revelation principle may not be valid (Epstein and Peters (1996)). Future researches in
this direction will yield an integrated theory of loan market competition.
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31Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 3.2
First, we show that the supports of the three bid distributions, (Fg;Fu;Fb), do not overlap except
for the endpoints. Since the proof is similar, we show the result only for the pair (Fg;Fu). Suppose,
to the contrary, that [rgL;rgH] \ [ruL;ruH] = [r1;r2], with r1 6= r2. Then ms(r) = ms(r2) for all
r 2 [r1;r2] and s = g;u. Using (2.3), we can rewrite these requirements as
"
Pr(q = gjs = g); ¡Pr(q = bjs = g)
Pr(q = gjs = u); ¡Pr(q = bjs = u)
#"
(yr ¡1)W(rjq = g)¡ (yr2 ¡1)W(r2jq = g)
W(rjq = b)¡ W(r2jq = b)
#
= 0:
The above coe±cient matrix is invertible and so W(rjq = b) = W(r2jq = b) for all r 2 [r1;r2].
But this cannot hold, since Fg(r) or Fu(r) is strictly increasing in r for some r 2 (r1;r2), implying
that W(rjq = b) is strictly decreasing in r for some r 2 (r1;r2). Thus, Fg and Fu do not have
overlapping supports except for the endpoints.
Next, we show that ruL = rgH if u > 0. The proof for rbL = ruH when b > 0 is similar.
Suppose, to the contrary, that u > 0 but ruL 6= rgH. We have four cases.
Case (i): ruH = rgL ´ r¤. In this case the support of Fb does not cover (ruL;rgH), since the
supports of any two bid distributions cannot overlap. That is, Fb(r) is constant (either 0 or 1)
for all r 2 (ruL;rgH) and we use F¤
b to denote it. When u > 0, the payo® to a bank U in this
case can be obtained from (2.3) as follows:
Emu(r 2 [ruL;r¤]) = (yr ¡ 1)®[1 ¡(1 ¡p)uFu(r) ¡(1 ¡°)pbF¤
b ]n¡1
¡(1 ¡ ®)[1 ¡ (1 ¡ p)uFu(r) ¡ °pbF¤
b ]n¡1:
Since Emu is constant over the support, then Em0
u(r) = 0 for all r 2 [ruL;r¤]. In particular,
Em0
















A1 = 1 ¡(1 ¡p)u ¡(1 ¡°)pbF¤
b ; A2 = 1 ¡(1 ¡p)u ¡°pbF¤
b :
32There is a pro¯table opportunity for a bank G to deviate. In particular, consider a deviation by
a bank G to bidding r¤ ¡ ", where " > 0 is arbitrarily small. The payo® is
Emg(r¤ ¡") = [y(r¤ ¡ ") ¡1)]®°[1 ¡(1 ¡p)uFu(r¤ ¡")¡ (1¡ °)pbF¤
b ]n¡1
¡(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡°)[1 ¡(1 ¡p)uFu(r¤ ¡") ¡°pbF¤
b ]n¡1:
















This is violated, given (A.1).
Case (ii): ruH < rgL and the support of Fb is not a subset of [ruH;rgL]. In this case, Fb(r)
is again constant (either 0 or 1) for all r 2 (ruL;rgH). The payo® to a bank U from bidding
r 2 [ruL;ruH] is
Emu = (yruH ¡1)®[1 ¡ (1 ¡ p)u ¡ (1 ¡ °)pbF¤
b ]n¡1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)[1 ¡ (1 ¡ p)u ¡ °pbF¤
b ]n¡1:
This is an increasing function of ruH. That is, if a bank U deviates from the distribution Fu
and bids slightly higher than ruH, the bid has the same winning probability as ruH does and yet
receives a higher pro¯t when it wins. Thus, ruH < rgL cannot be an equilibrium in this case.
Case (iii): ruH < rgL and the support of Fb is a subset of [ruH;rgL]. In this case, rbH · rgL,
but this cannot hold in equilibrium, as the same arguments in Cases (i) and (ii) can be repeated
for the pair (Fg;Fb) to yield a contradiction.
Case (iv): ruH > rgL. In this case, we must have ruL ¸ rgH, since the supports of Fg and Fu
cannot overlap except for the endpoints. Since ruL 6= rgH by the supposition, then ruL > rgH. If
the support of Fb is not a subset of [rgH;ruL], then the argument in Case (ii) shows that there
is incentive for a bank G to deviate to a bid slightly higher than rgH. If the support of Fb is a
subset of [rgH;ruL], then rbH · ruL, but this cannot be consistent with an equilibrium since the
arguments in Cases (i) and (ii) can be repeated for the pair (Fu;Fb) to yield a contradiction.
Therefore, rgH = ruL. This completes the proof of the Lemma.
33B. Proof of Proposition 3.4
We ¯rst show b = 0. Suppose, to the contrary, b > 0. Then the expected pro¯t for a bank B
must be non-negative which, by (2.3), requires






[1 ¡(1 ¡°)p ¡(1 ¡p)u]n¡1:
Substituting this into (2.3) for s = u one can show that mu(ruH) > 0 (note ruH = rbL). Thus,














which is infeasible under Assumption 1. Thus, b = 0.
Next, we can show u < 1 for all p > 0: If u = 1, one can calculate the expected pro¯t for a
bank U from (2.3) and show that it is negative for any p > 0 under Assumption 1.
Now if a bank U participates in bidding, it must be indi®erent between bidding and not
bidding (since u < 1). The payo® from bidding must be zero. Substituting b = 0 into (2.3) for
s = u and setting mu(r) = 0 yields (3.7). Setting Fu(ruL) = 0 in (3.7) gives (3.6). Also, since
banks B do not bid, ruH = 1 by the proof of Lemma 3.2 (Case (ii) there). Setting r = 1 in (3.7)
and solving for u yields (3.5). Then u > 0 if and only if p < pA(n). When p < pA(n), the cdf
Fu de¯ned implicitly by (3.7) has a positive derivative for all r 2 (ruL;ruH) and so has a positive
density. Moreover, it can be veri¯ed that u(p;n) decreases with p and ruL(p;n) increases with p.
Finally, we need to show that there is no incentive for a bank U to deviate from the bid
distribution Fu, given that other banks U use Fu and that other banks G use Fg described later
in proposition 3.5. The proof for this part follows a similar procedure to that used in Case (i) in
the proof of Lemma 3.2.
C. Proof of Proposition 4.1
We ¯rst verify that Tg has the described dependence on c. Recall that u > 0 i® c > cA. When
c > cA, substituting u from (3.5) into (4.1) yields Tg = pn( 1
pA ¡ °)n, which is an increasing
34function of p and hence a decreasing function of c. When c < cA, substituting u = 0 into (4.1)
yields Tg = (1 ¡°p)n, which is a decreasing function of p and hence an increasing function of c.
For the e®ect of c on Rg, examine ¯rst the case c < cA. In this case, setting u = 0 and















¡n(1 ¡ °)[1 +(2° ¡1)z]n¡1 ¡




where z = 1=(p¡1 ¡ °) is an increasing function of p. It can be veri¯ed that [(1 + x)n ¡ 1]=x is
an increasing function of x for any x > 0. Then Rg is a decreasing function of z and hence a
decreasing function of p. Since p decreases with c, Rg is an increasing function of c.







n(2° ¡ 1)(x ¡1 + °)n¡1 + (xA ¡°)n ¡(xA ¡ 1 +°)n
xn ¡ (xA ¡ °)n
)
;
where x = 1=p and xA = 1=pA(n). The derivative of Rg with respect to x has the same sign as
that of h(x) where
h(x) = n(1 ¡°) ¡x ¡ (n ¡1)x1¡n(xA ¡°)n
+
(x ¡1 + °)2¡n
2° ¡ 1
[(xA ¡ 1 +°)n ¡ (xA ¡ °)n]:
This is clearly negative when x ! 1. Thus, dRg=dc < 0 when c is close to but lower than c0.































(Y ¡Y 2¡n)(Y + 1)n¡1 ¡(n¡ 1)(Y ¡ 1)
i
35The expression in [:] is an increasing function of Y and has value 0 when Y = 1. Thus, h(x) > 0,
i.e., dRg=dc > 0 when c is close to cA. Thus, there exists c¤ 2 (cA;c0) such that dRg=dc > 0 for
all c < c¤. This completes the proof of Proposition 4.1.
D. Proof of Proposition 4.3
To prove the proposition, we ¯rst establish the following lemma:
Lemma D.1. The following relations hold for all p > 0:








Proof. The left-hand side of (D.1) is a decreasing function of p and has a value zero when
p = 0. Thus (D.1) is evident. Computing the derivative in (D.2) shows that it has the same sign
as that of the left-hand side of (D.1) and so it is negative.
We now show that equilibrium screening probability is a decreasing function of n. Di®erenti-


















(1¡°p)n¡2 ln[1 ¡ (1 ¡ °)p]
)
, if c < cA, (D.4)
where








Clearly, dp=dn < 0 for c > cA. When 0 < c < cA, EMg > 0 implies
y > 1 +
(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ °)
®°
µ









(1¡ °p)[1 ¡(1 ¡°)p]
(n ¡1)(2° ¡1)
fln[1 ¡(1 ¡°)p]¡ ln(1 ¡ °p)g > 0: (D.6)
36Thus, dp=dn < 0 for c 2 (0;cA) as well.
To show the dependence of Tg on n, examine ¯rst the case c < cA. Di®erentiate Tg = (1¡°p)n






















Using (D.2) it can be verify that the expression in f:g is an increasing function of p and that its
value at p = 0 is positive. Thus, dTg=dn > 0 for c < cA.
For c > cA, let » = 1=(n¡1) and ¾ = ®(y¡1)=(1¡®) > 1. Solving p as a function of c from




















The following two properties can be veri¯ed: (i) dlnTg=d» is an increasing function of c=c0; (ii)
dlnTg=d» > 0 when c ! c0. Thus, there exists some c1 < c0 such that Tg is an increasing function
of » and hence a decreasing function of n if and only if c > c1. The level c1 may or may not be
greater than cA. Since the current case is restricted to c > cA, let c¤¤ = maxfc1;cAg. Then Tg is
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Figure 2a E®ects of the screening cost on the screening
probability and uninformed banks' participation (nn = 6)
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Figure 2b E®ects of the screening cost on loan market
tightness and the expected loan rate (nn = 6)
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Figure 3a E®ects of the number of banks on tightness, the
expected loan rate and screening probability { low c (cc = 0:056)
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Figure 3b E®ects of the number of banks on the winning
bid distribution { low c (cc = 0:056)
(nL = 3;nH = 15)
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Figure 4a E®ects of the number of banks on tightness, the expected
rate, screening probability and participation{high c (cc = 0:119)
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Figure 4b E®ects of the number of banks on the winning
bid distribution { high c (cc = 0:119)
(nL = 3;nH = 15)
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Figure 5a E®ects of the number of banks on tightness, the expected rate
rate, screening probability and participation { moderate c (cc = 0:098)
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Figure 5b E®ects of the number of banks on the winning
bid distribution { moderate c (cc = 0:098)
(nL = 3;nH = 15)
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Figure 6a The market tightness across ¯rms' age with n1 and
n2 banks; an older ¯rm has a higher ® (n1 = 4;n2 = 10)
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Figure 6b The market tightness across ¯rms' age with n1 and
n2 banks; an older ¯rm has a lower c (n1 = 4;n2 = 10)
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